OAuth discovery metadata points your agent at an internal URL. How would you prevent SSRF?
Instruction: Explain which fetches are at risk, how to enforce destination policy, and how to test redirects and DNS changes.
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I’d treat every discovered URL as untrusted input to a privileged network client. That includes resource metadata, authorization-server metadata, and any endpoints taken from those documents. A URL using HTTPS can still target an internal service, so I’d enforce both an allowed scheme and a destination policy...
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Work through these questions in order. Read the answer aloud, then explain it in your own words.
1. Start with the foundations
Build the vocabulary and explain the core decisions.
2. Apply it to a real workflow
Practice diagnosis, validation, and everyday tradeoffs.
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3. Prepare for senior discussions
Explain failure boundaries, recovery, and production choices.
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