What information should never flow from untrusted content straight into tool execution?

Instruction: Explain what kinds of information require validation before tool use.

Context: Validating extracted data without letting it assign tool authority.

Updated

Example Answer

I would not let source text set the acting identity, permissions, approval status, tool implementation, or unrestricted command to execute. Those decisions belong to the application’s trusted state. Useful data can still come from an untrusted document, but it needs validation in the context of an authorized task. For example, extracting a customer address is different from letting the same document instruct the assistant to send records to that address. I’d use narrow tool schemas, server-side authorization, and destination checks so a plausible field value cannot quietly expand the action’s authority.

Concrete example

A retrieved invoice can propose an amount to inspect. It cannot choose the tenant, bypass approval, or replace the approved destination for a payment.

Limit to explain

Schema-valid data may still be unauthorized. Type checks complement permission and business-rule checks; they do not replace them.

Follow-up to practice

How would you distinguish a legitimate extracted destination from an injected instruction?

Your preparation path

Work through these questions in order. Read the answer aloud, then explain it in your own words.

Related Questions